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REscISsIoN-I EruRN OF CONSIDERATION

The past year appears to have been a relatively unexciting one in
the Tennessee chancery courts, if the cases reaching the higher courts
on appeal are a fair indication. No new developments in the law are
to be found in these appellate decisions, nor have the courts been
called upon to adapt established rules to unique fact situations. It
may be of some significance that in four of the five cases deemed
worthy of comment, the upper court fully agreed with the chancellors'
decisions which had denied the relief sought by complainants, and in
the fifth case the decree for complainant was modified to reduce the
scope of the relief granted below. Whether these results suggest a
trend toward restricting the application of the extraordinary remedies
of equity, I would not venture to guess; but, by coincidence or not,
it was a rather discouraging year for litigants seeking equitable relief
in the upper courts.
I. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE

OF FRAUDs

In Fortnerv. Wilkinson, the supreme court again demonstrated its
inclination to apply the statute of frauds rather strictly in land sale
contracts.' Plaintiff sought specific enforcement of a real estate sale
which defendant, acting as trustee under a security deed of trust, had.

held and at which plaintiff had been the highest bidder. Defendant
accepted plaintiff's check for the full amount of the purchase price,

and a further small sum in cash for registration of the deed which
defendant promised to prepare for him; but no written memorandum
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Illinois and Virginia Bars.
1. 357 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1962).
2. See previous references to this subject in Smedley, Equity-1961 Tennessee
Survey, 14 VAND. L. 1Ev. 1281, 1294 (1961), and 1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND-

L. REv. 1267, 1276 (1958).
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of the sale was executed. Three weeks later defendant returned the
check and cash, and refused to execute the deed. When sued for
specific performance defendant pleaded the statute of frauds by
demurrer. The chancellor sustained the demurrer and dismissed the
suit, and the supreme court affirmed, disposing of the principal issue
of the case in one brief sentence: "The sale of land by a trustee under
authority of a trust deed is within the purview of the Statute of
Frauds."3 The only authority cited for this proposition was a 90-yearold Tennessee decision. 4 While there appears to have been no later
precedent in this state, ample support for the rule is available in other
jurisdictions, where the courts have generally agreed that a sale held
by a mortgagee under a power of sale or by a trustee under powers
conferred by a security deed of trust is not enforceable unless evidenced by some written memorandum.5
Two arguments may be advanced with some force against the
application of the statute of frauds to such sales. First, since under
the usual statute regulating enforcement of the power of sale the
trustee or mortgagee is required to hold a public sale, after repeated
advertisement, and at a time and place convenient to persons interested in bidding, it may be reasonably contended that there is no
real need for the statutory protection against fraudulent claims that
a sale was made. Normally in attendance on such occasions would be
the trustee or mortgagee, an auctioneer, the debtor-owner, prospective
bidders, and miscellaneous bystanders, all of whom could be called
on to establish the fact that a sale was or was not made. With this
array of evidence available, the courts should generally be able to
determine whether a claim is false, and the removal of the writing
requirement would make it possible to prevent the injustice which
arises from allowing the dissatisfied party to repudiate a sale merely
because it was oral. However, it must be conceded that such a result
is not suggested by a literal reading of the typical statute of frauds,
and no case has been found in which this reasoning has been adopted.
A second argument is that these foreclosure sales should come
under the widely accepted rule that judicial sales are not within the
application of the statute of frauds.6 Under this view, it is reasoned
3. Fortner v. Wilkinson, 357 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tenn. 1962).
4. Adams v. Scales, 60 Tenn. 337 (1872).
5. See Brown v. Roberson, 214 Ala. 18, 106 So. 181 (1925); Seymour v. National
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 Ga. 285, 42 S.E. 518 (1902); Weiner v. Slovin, 270 Mass.
392, 169 N.E. 64 (1930); Coffman v. Brannen, 50 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
6. In re Susquehanna Chem. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Green v.
Freeman, 126 Ga. 274, 55 S.E. 45 (1906); Beeson v. Pierce, 51 Ind. App. 201, 98
N.E. 380 (1912); Cook v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 172 Md. 398, 191 AUt. 713
(1937); Przewozniczek v. Machowicz, 123 Misc. 376, 205 N.Y. Supp. 795 (Erie
County Ct. 1924); Robertson v. Smith, 94 Va. 250, 26 S.E. 579 (1897); Rice v.
Ahlman, 70 Wash. 12, 126 Pac. 66 (1912).
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that since the sale conducted by the trustee or mortgagee takes the
place of a foreclosure sale held pursuant to judicial proceedings, it
should be placed in the same classification as regards the formal
requirements. However, the courts have rejected this logic. It is
true that in one sense the creditor's sale is equivalent to a judicial sale
in a foreclosure proceeding-i.e., in both instances the security lien is
enforced by cutting off inferior interests in the land and by raising
money to pay off the secured debt.7 However, in relation to the
statute of frauds, there is said to be a vital difference, because when
the sale is held under authority of a court there is no need for a
written agreement between the parties as a means of forestalling
fraudulent claims. As the Tennessee court has explained:
[I]n sales directed in a Chancery Court, the whole business is transacted
by a public officer under the guidance or superintendence of the Court itself. Even when the sale is made, it is not final until a report is made to the

Court, and it is approved and confirmed." And in reference to sales by
sheriffs the reason of the rule . . . is that "the return is a memorandum of8
sale, by authority of law, which can be made available to the purchaser.
The trustee's or mortgagee's sale, though publicly held, is conducted
under the authority conferred privately by the debtor, and is not
surrounded by such safeguards as court supervision, judicial confirmance and written reports made by a public official.
Even while conceding the force of this line of reasoning, one may
still be justified in feeling that the law should not allow the foreclosing creditor to take advantage of his own omission in order to
defeat the expectations of the unwary purchaser who has not realized
that he should obtain a written evidence of the sale. In the Fortner
case, plaintiff alleged that he attended the sale which was held as
advertised, that he made the highest bid and gave his check to
defendant for the full amount of the price, that defendant accepted
the check, kept it for three weeks, and then returned it with a letter.
Since the letter apparently did not mention the purpose for which
the check had been given, all of these events produced neither a
memorandum signed by the party to be charged nor part performance
sufficient to support a specific performance decree, 9 and so the pur7. Seymour v. National Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 5.
8. Adams v. Scales, supra note 4, at 341, quoting Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mass. (C.C.)
420, and Nichol v. Ridley, 13 Tenn. 63 (1833). See also In re Susquehanna Chem.
Corp., supra note 6, at 918: ("The purchaser at a judicial sale enjoys sufficient protection by the decree of the court under which the sale was made."); Beeson v.
Pierce, supra note 6, 98 N.E. at 381; Robertson v. Smith, supra note 6, 26 S.E. at
580.
9. Tennessee has not adopted the part performance doctrine as a basis for
enforcing oral land sale contracts in equity [see discussion in Note, 2 VAND. L. REv.
451 (1949)], but even in the jurisdictions which do apply that doctrine, payment of the
purchase price is generally not considered sufficient past performance.
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chaser was left without remedy either at law or in equity. While the
court seems to have followed the prevailing rules of law in this case,
the result of such a decision lends some weight to the contention that
the statute of frauds may produce as much injustice as it prevents.
II. RESCISSION-FRAUD AND MIsTAKE
An attempt by the grantor to have two deeds rescinded on grounds
of fraud and grossly inadequate consideration was unsuccessful in
Pipkin v. Lentz, 0 because of the insufficiency of plaintiffs proof to
sustain his allegations of fraud, and perhaps because of either a failure
of plaintiff to present the other phase of his case concisely or a failure
by the court of appeals to view this argument in its intended context.
In 1947, plaintiff had inherited 65 acres of land from his adoptive
mother, who had purchased the property earlier in the same year for
$9,000. His adoptive father acquired curtesy rights in this land, due
to the fact that a child, which had lived only a few hours, had been
born to him and his wife many years earlier. At the age of 19, plaintiff obtained a chancery court decree removing his disability of
minority, and the following day he conveyed 7 acres of the 65 acre
tract to defendant for $1,200, neither party realizing that the land
was subject to the curtesy. Plaintiff went to Texas to live, but returned in about 18 months and offered to sell the remaining 58 acres
to defendant. The latter, having by then learned that plaintiff's father
had some interest in the land, was not anxious to buy, but finally did
offer $550, which offer plaintiff accepted. The deed conveying the 58
acres to defendant recited that plaintiff sold, conveyed, etc., "all right,
title and interest, being a one-half share and interest in and to a certain
tract... [describing the 58 acre tract]. "u" This conveyance was made
in November, 1955, and soon thereafter defendant purchased the
father's curtesy interest in the entire 65 acres for $6,500. Four years
later, the land having risen considerably in value, plaintiff brought
suit to have the conveyances he had made to defendant set aside "for
fraud and such inadequate consideration as to shock the conscience
of the court." As an alternative basis for relief, plaintiff alleged that
he had conveyed only a one-half interest in the 58 acre tract.
The chancellor dismissed the bill, on findings that the evidence did
not indicate that defendant had fraudulently induced plaintiff to make
the conveyances, and that the second deed conveyed all of plaintiff's
interest in the land. The court of appeals affirmed, and in a careful
review of the proof submitted clearly demonstrated that plaintiff's
10. 354 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961), cert. denied, execution no. 10, 195-6,
Tenn. Sup. Ct., July 26, 1961.
11. Pipkin v. Lentz, supra note 10, at 88.
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claim of fraud was not sustained. In rejecting the other basis for rescission, however, the court was not as persuasive in its resolution of
the question of what interest in the land the parties had thought was
being conveyed. Pointing out that the deed first declared that "all
right, title and interest" was transferred, the court reasoned that the
phrase immediately following, "being a one-half share and interest,"
could not limit the all-inclusive effect of the preceding language. Two
rules of construction were cited in support of this conclusion: 1 2 (1)
An instrument should be construed against the grantor when the
description of the quantity of the estate is doubtful; (2) When the
property is sufficiently described as a whole, that description cannot
be limited by a general statement which may be given a construction
inconsistent with the prior inclusive grant. However, the court
asserted that it would not be controlled by technical rules of construction, but rather would "look to the intention of the instrument
as a proper guide." So saying, it immediately invoked a code provision which declares that: "Every grant . . .of real estate, or any
interest therein, shall pass all the estate or interest of a grantor ...
unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest shall appear by
express terms, or be necessarily implied in the terms of the instrument."' 3 This statutory mandate and plaintiffs own testimony that he
thought he was selling all of the interest he had in the property were
found to require the conclusion that the deed conveyed the fee title
subject to plaintiff's father's curtesy interest, and not merely a onehalf interest in the land.
Though fairly persuasive as far as it goes, this reasoning resolves
the case only by ignoring what appears to have been a mutual mistake
of the parties which might well call for rescission of the 58-acre deed.
Surely the phrase "being a one-half share and interest" was inserted in
the deed for some purpose, and the only apparent purpose it could
have served was to indicate precisely the quantity of the estate which
the parties regarded as being conveyed. In this sense, it is not inconsistent with the broader term which precedes it, because, when
read together, the two parts of the granting clause indicate that the
grantor intended to state: "I convey all of my right and title, which
is a one-half share and interest in the property."
The circumstances under which the conveyance was made bear
out this assumption. After buying the 7-acre tract, defendant discovered that plaintiff's title to the property inherited from his mother
was not absolute, but that the father had some interest in it. When
the second deed was made, therefore, both parties knew that plaintiff
was not actually conveying "all right, title and interest" in the 58
12. Id. at 93.
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-501 (1956).
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acres, because he did not have the ability to do so. They knew he
could only convey whatever interest the father did not own. Knowing
that at the death of the mother, plaintiff and his father were the
persons to whom the mother's property passed, but not understanding
the nature of a curtesy right (as laymen can hardly be expected to
do), they could naturally assume that plaintiff and his father each had
an undivided one-half interest in the land. Against this background,
the statement in the deed that a one-half interest was being conveyed
becomes unambiguous, and neither the technical rules of construction,
the code provision, nor plaintiff's testimony requires a finding that the
parties intended to convey a fee subject to curtesy.
If a one-half interest was the estate which the parties had in mind,
the price of $550 was apparently agreed upon as a fair amount for that
interest. However, the fee to the entire tract, though subject to
curtesy, was certainly much more valuable than a one-half interest,
and so the mutual mistake of the parties must have resulted in a
clearly inadequate consideration having been set for the conveyance
of plaintiff's actual estate in the land. The court conceded that the
consideration for the 58 acres was inadequate, in view of the fact
that defendant purchased plaintiff's fee interest in the entire 65-acre
tract for only $1,750 and then soon afterwards paid plaintiff's father
$6,500 for his curtesy interest, which would continue only during the
father's lifetime. Under this state of facts, plaintiff could have made
a very strong case for rescission of the second deed on the ground of
mutual mistake of material fact,14 because the resulting transaction
conferred an unintended and undeserved benefit on defendant and
imposed an oppressive hardship on plaintiff. Though it was correctly
observed in the Pitkin case opinion that mere inadequacy of consideration is not ordinarily a basis for such equitable relief, 15 mutual
mistake which produces a grossly unfair bargain does justify rescission,
with such adjustment of the equities as the court deems proper.'(
14. McCuNrrocK, EQUITY §§ 88, 89 (2d ed. 1948); PosERoy, EQurry JUIusPIUDENCE
§§ 856, 856a, 870, 871a (5th ed. 1941); REsTATEMENT, CoNnAacTs § 502 (1932).
The Tennessee courts have repeatedly recognized mistake as a ground for rescission
of deeds or contracts. Early v. Street, 192 Tenn. 463, 474, 241 S.W.2d 531, 536
(1951); McMillan v. American Suburban Corp., 136 Tenn. 53, 59, 188 S.W. 615,
617 (1916); Spivey v. Roadman, 6 Tenn. App. 442, 447 (E.S. 1927).
15. 354 S.W.2d at 92. See also Stamper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812
(1906); Talbott v. Manard, 106 Tenn. 60, 59 S.W. 340 (1900); Mann v. Russey, 101
Tenn. 596, 49 S.W. 835 (1898).
16. In his bill of complaint, plaintiff indicated his willingness to repay to defendant
the amount he had paid for the two deeds, thus satisfying the requirement that the
party seeking rescission must make restitution of the consideration received from the
other party. See MCCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 14, § 86. If only the 58-acre
deed were to be rescinded (it being the only one to which the mutual mistake ground
discussed in the text would apply), the court could require plaintiff to make some
payment to compensate defendant for the burden of the curtesy interest which he
unwittingly assumed in purchasing the 7-acre tract.
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III.

NEw TniAL AFTEm JUDGmENT AT LAw

Further evidence of the reluctance of Tennessee chancery courts

to grant new trials after judgments at law was provided by the decision in Proffitt v. Stalans.17 The courts of this state have long declared that the chancellors have the power to grant such relief, 8 but
the occasions on which the power has actually been exercised are
apparently extremely rare.' 9 A general test for determining whether
equity should grant a new trial to the unsuccessful party in a law suit

was adopted in early decisions and has been frequently reiterated in
later opinions: "This kind of relief... when granted, must be based

upon clear proof of fraud on the part of the successful party at law,
or of unavoidable accident, unmixed with negligence on the part of
the unsuccessful party or his agent."2 0 Occasionally, the ground relied
upon for persuading the chancellor to order a new trial has been that

complainant did not receive a fair trial of the case at law because of

some fraud or imposition by the opposing party; 21 but more often the
complaint is that after an adverse judgment at law, the unsuccessful
party has been unable, because of accident or mistake, to secure a new
17. 209 Tenn. 214, 352 S.W.2d. 231 (1961).
18. See Wallace v. Walker, 197 Tenn. 473, 274 S.W.2d 5 (1954); Tennessee Cent.
Ry. v. Tedder, 170 Tenn. 639, 98 S.W.2d 307 (1936); Kirkpatrick v. Utley, 82
Tenn. 96 (1884); Powell v. Cyfers, 48 Tenn. 526 (1870); George v. Alexander, 46
Tenn. 641 (1869); Seay v. Hughes, 37 Tenn. 155 (1857); GmsoN, Surrs IN CHANcE Y
§§ 1269-1271 (5th ed. 1955).
19. In the Proffitt case, note 17 supra, at 232, it was said that the last reported
case in which the supreme court had approved such relief was O'Quinn v. Baptist
Memorial Hosp., 182 Tenn. 558, 188 S.W.2d. 346 (1945); and in the O'Quinn
opinion the statement is made: "We have, in the instant case, for the first time, a
showing of facts and circumstances which, as held by the chancellor, clearly
sustain the claim of complainant below to relief." 182 Tenn. at 562, 188 S.W. 2d at
348. (Emphasis added.) However, relief had been granted also in Holcomb v.
Canady, 49 Tenn. 610 (1871). See also State ex rel. Terry v. Yarnell, 156 Tenn. 327,
5 S.W.2d 471 (1927).
20. Powell v. Cyfers, supra note 18, at 527. Substantially the same statement is to
be found in most of the other cases cited in notes 18 and 19 supra.
21. Powell v. Cyfers, upra note 18 (complainant alleged that he was unable to
appear and defend in the law action because of threats to his person; relief denied
because he failed to allege that the opposing party was responsible for the threats,
and because complainant could have defended adequately through an attorney);
Wallace v. Walker, supra note 18 (complainant alleged that the opposing party had
prevailed in the law action by use of false testimony; relief denied because the
allegations were too general to state a ground for equity's intervention); Holcomb
v. Canady, supra note 19 (complainant alleged that his failure to appear to defend
at law was due to the unsettled conditions immediately following the Civil War, he
being old and infirm and unable to travel to the county in which the suit was brought,
and that plaintiff at law had deliberately filed the action in such a manner as to take
advantage of complainant's difficulties; relief granted on the ground that, if the
allegations were true, the judgment at law was "unfairly and unconscientiously obtained"). In George v. Alexander, supra note 18, the complainant sought equitable
relief on the ground that he had discovered a defense to the cause of action at law
only after the judgment had become final.
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trial or to obtain an authenticated bill of exceptions as a basis for an
appeal.22 In the latter situation, the granting or denial of equitable
relief generally turns on whether the court determines that complainant's troubles are of his own making.
Such was the case in Proffitt v. Stalans. In the action at law, a
judgment for $1,890 had been rendered against the present complainants; but the motions of both parties for a new trial had been
sustained, and at the second trial the judgment against the present
complainants was for $6,690. Their motion for another trial was
denied, but an appeal was granted. However, when the bill of exceptions was presented to the trial judge, certain exhibits which had
been used in the trial were missing, and the judge refused to sign the
bill or to allow the appellants to supply copies of the exhibits. The
original exhibits had been deposited with the clerk of the court, and
were eventually found, but not until several days after the deadline for
authenticating the bill of exceptions. Consequently, the court of appeals could only review the case on the technical record, and affirmed
the judgment below. Contending that the failure to perfect a bill of
exceptions was due to accident not caused by their fault, and that
because of the lack of a bill of exceptions they were deprived of an
effective appeal, complainants filed a bill in the chancery court to
obtain a new trial and an injunction against enforcing the judgment.
The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill, and the supreme
court affirmed. Recognizing the power of the chancellor to grant
such relief, the court declared that the power should not be exercised
"unless the party aggrieved was fraudulently or unlawfully or unconsciously deprived of his regular remedy for the correction of the
errors, if any, committed in the law court."23 In determining that
complainants failed to meet this test, the court stressed two factors:
(1) complainants had already had their case tried twice in the law
court, both trials had ended in adverse judgments, and the trial judge
had found no cause for disturbing the second judgment; and (2)
complainants had delayed four months after the second trial before
presenting the bill of exceptions for authentication, apparently without checking to see whether the needed exhibits were still available.
The significance of the first factor appears to have been diminished
by the court's own declaration that "we are in no sense intending to
comment on the merits of the lawsuit because the merits and demerits
22. O'Quinn v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., supra note 19; Larkey Lumber & Wrecking
Co. v. Byrnes, 181 Tenn. 405, 181 S.W.2d 361 (1944); Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Tedder,
supra note 18; State ex rel. Terry v. Yarnell, supra note 19; Kirkpatrick v. Utley,
supra note 18; Seay v. Hughes, supra note 18; Mitchell v. Porter, 26 Tenn. App, 498,
173 S.W.2d 443 (W.S. 1942).
23. Proffitt v. Stalans, supra note 17 at 217, 352 S.W.2d at 234.

19631

EQUIT

of that case are not before us . ... "24 The court's further observation
that "it is presumed until shown otherwise that this was a valid and
fair judgment," does not seem to damage complainants' position in the
present proceedings, because he is not asking the court to declare the
judgment unfair or invalid, but is seeking only an opportunity to overcome the presumption of validity in a new trial.
The main basis for denying relief would seem, therefore, to lie in

the conclusion that complainants' inability to perfect the bill of exceptions resulted from their own negligence. Since it was not complainants, but rather the clerk of the circuit court, who misplaced the

exhibits, and since the practice of delaying the final preparation of the
bill of exceptions until near the end of the allotted time is not particularly unusual among attorneys, the decision may be somewhat
harsh. Nevertheless, it conforms to the established tendency of the

Tennessee courts to hold the appellant at law to a very strict standard
of diligence in pursuing the regular legal means of obtaining a new
trial or perfecting an appeal.s2 Only in situations in which complainant had no conceivable way to secure the desired action from the

law court has the granting of a new trial by a chancellor been approved-as where the trial judge was appointed to the supreme court

and left the circuit bench two days after the judgment was rendered,2

and where the trial judge arbitrarily refused to sign a bill of exceptions because the opposing counsel would not approve it 21 Whether
or not the policies of achieving prompt termination of litigation and
24. bU&
25. See, e.g., Seay v. Hughes, supra note 18 (after the bill of exception was signed
by the circuit judge, it was lost by him before ever being delivered to appellant);
Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Tedder, supra note 18 (trial judge was out of the state during
the last week in which the bill of exceptions could be signed, and his clerk signed the
bill on telephoned instructions from the judge, but this was not sufficient to authenticate
the bill); Larkey Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Byrnes, supra note 22 (trial judge was
appointed to the court of appeals bench three weeks after the judgment, so that
appellant was not able to obtain his signature on the bill of exceptions during the last
week of the alloted 30-day period); Mitchell v. Porter, supra note 22 (the judgment
was rendered on the last day of the term of court, and the unsuccessful party obtained
an order from the trial judge to extend the term in order to allow a motion for a new
trial to be filed, but the order was legally insufficient because of a technical omission).
In each of these instances, the complainant was denied equitable relief because the
court ruled that it would have been possible for him to have pursued his legal
remedy effectively. See In re Lewis' Estate, 45 Tenn. App. 651, 653, 325 S.W.2d 647,
649 (W.S. 1958) in which a court of appeals judge expressed his disapproval of the
severity of the requirement of diligenoe imposed, in the Tedder case.
26. O'Quinn v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., supra note 19: "the plaintiff . . . was
extremely diligent. . . . In other words, not 'a day was lost in an effort to secure his
rights. ... So, applicant's rights were completely cut off without even an opportunity
to present either his motion for a new trial or his bill of exceptions for which the
law allows thirty days." 182 Tenn. at 562, 188 S.W. 2d at 348.
27. State ex rel. Terry v. Yarnell, supra note 22: "the petitioner acted with due
diligence ....
We do not see that the petitioner or his counsel has been at all remiss
in the matter.
... 156 Tenn. at 329, 5 S.W.2d at 471.
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of maintaining comity between the chancery and circuit courts justify
such a severe restriction on the use of this equitable remedy is debatable; but there is no doubt that Tennessee attorneys have again
been put on clear and unequivocal notice to practice the utmost
diligence in moving for new trials and in perfecting appeals after
adverse judgments.
IV.

INJUNCTION-PERPETRATION OF A NuIsANcE

Confronted with the troublesome problem of whether to prohibit
the operation of a legitimate business enterprise because of its harmful effect on adjacent residents, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern
Section in Hagamanv. Slaughter28 wisely followed the pattern which
had been established by a sister court in Crabtreev. City Auto Salvage
Co.2 9 a year earlier. In the Hagaman case, residents of the city of
Bristol who lived near Slaughter's junk yard complained that the
premises had become a breeding place for rats and mosquitoes, constituted a hazard to children playing in the neighborhood, and had
caused other property in the area to depreciate in value. The chancellor granted an injunction ordering defendant to cease using the
premises as a junk yard and to remove the accumulated junk within
thirty days. The court of appeals, though agreeing that the evidence
fully supported the finding of a nuisance, pointed out that defendant's
business is a lawful one and does not constitute a nuisance per se;
therefore, it held that "the injunction should have been confined to the
offensive features of the operation if that could be done and still allow
the business to operate." 3° By this means, equity is able to protect
the neighboring residents against the injurious effect of the offensive
conditions which the proprietor has allowed to develop on his property, but can still permit him to attempt to carry on his legitimate
business in a proper manner. Thus, the conflicting interests of the
two parties are reconciled as far as possible. If subsequent experience
demonstrates that the business cannot be conducted without the
objectionable factors recurring, then an absolute injunction may be
obtained.
In addition to reaching a proper result by a sound process of reasoning, the court also found it possible to decide a nuisance case without
even taking notice of the strange rule that equity must in some
situations refrain from giving injunctive relief until a court of law
28. 354 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961), cert. denied, Tenn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8,

1962.
29. 47 Tenn. App. 616, 340 S.W.2d 940 (M.S. 1960), discussed in Smedley, Equity
-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1961).
30. Hagaman v. Slaughter, supra note 28, at 822.
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has established the fact that a nuisance exists. 31 One may hope that
this is an indication that Tennessee chancery courts are throwing off
any lingering effect which this baseless restriction may have had in
the past.2
V.

RESCISSION-RETURN

OF

CONSIDERATION

In a case which claims attention mostly because of the puzzling
situation out of which the suit arose, the supreme court denied
rescission of a judgment assignment on the ground that the assignor
did not tender the return of the consideration received for the assignment.3 The creditor had obtained a judgment against his debtor
and sureties. Eventually, the sureties paid the judgment, and the
creditor assigned all of his rights, title, and interest in it to the sureties,
apparently under the impression that he was signing a satisfaction of
the judgment rather than an assignment. The sureties promptly
assigned the judgment to a third party who had, unknown to the
creditor, furnished them the money to pay the creditor. More than
four years later, the creditor filed suit to rescind its assignment of the
judgment to the sureties, alleging that by a secret agreement between
the sureties and the third party, the latter had provided the money
and that the sureties had therefore furnished no consideration for
the assignment. Both the chancellor and the supreme court ruled
that the complaint should be dismissed.
Since the remedy of rescission is designed to restore the parties to
the positions they occupied prior to the transaction in question, the
party seeking this relief is, of course, required to return whatever
consideration he obtained in the transaction, unless the circumstances
of the case excuse him from this obligation.3 4 In the instant case, two
arguments might be advanced on behalf of complainant to justify
the granting of a rescission decree in spite of his having failed to
make restitution to defendants. First, it could be contended that
since defendants did not furnish the consideration for the assignment,
they were not entitled to a return of the money received by complainant. No such repayment was needed to restore defendants to status
quo, since their original position was, in reality, unchanged. The
supreme court disposed of this line of argument by pointing out that,
31. See Crabtree v. City Auto Salvage Co., supra note 29, at 627, 340 S.W.2d at
945: "a Court of equity will enjoin and abate nuisances without a judgment at law
establishing its existence, where the fact of the nuisance is made manifest by certain
and reliable proof, and the resulting injury is of a character that cannot be compensated
adequately by damages."
32. See discussion in Smedley, Equity-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REv.
1281, at 1283-85 (1961).
33. Lindsey-Davis Co. v. Siskin, 358 S.W.2d1 331 (Tenn. 1962).
34. See McCrunrrocK, op. cit. supra note 14, § 86; WALSH, EQurrY § 107 (1930).
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regardless of who furnished the consideration, complainant had received it, and in failing to tender a return to someone, he violated the
maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity."5 However, the
restitution requirement is hardly imposed on the basis of abstract
principles of equity, but rather to assure: (1) that injustice is not
visited on a defendant by depriving him of the expected benefits of
the rescinded transaction without also relieving him of the burden of
his performance; or (2) that unjust enrichment is not conferred on a
complainant by allowing him to retain the benefits of defendant's
performance while being relieved of his own obligation to perform.
In the instant case, if the defendant-sureties did not furnish the
consideration for the assignment, they would not seem to be entitled
to a return of it. But if rescission of the assignment would put the
complainant-creditor in position to collect the judgment from the
debtor, then allowing the former to keep the consideration for the
assignment would seem to create a case of unjust enrichment. The
facts of the case are not stated fully enough in the opinion to support
a firm conclusion as to either of these suppositions.
The second argument for sustaining complainant's bill is that equity
has the power to make its rescission decree conditional upon complainant's returning the consideration to the proper party, thereby
making sure that the rescission will not result in injustice to defendants or unjust enrichment to complainant.1 While this procedure
is admittedly consistent with equity's concept of the restitution requirement, the opinion in this case discloses no strong equitable
considerations for granting a conditional decree, inasmuch as there
was no indication either that complainant was ready to tender
restitution or that complainant had any particular reason for concern
as to the source of the money which it received in payment for the
assignment.
35. Lindsey-Davis Co. v. Siskin, supra note 33, at 333.
36. See note 34 supra.

